Access Tiers

Status: Available.

msh local classifies every intercepted request into one of four risk tiers. The classification happens in real-time with sub-millisecond latency and drives the policy engine's allow / escalate / deny decision.

OBSERVE

Read-only operations.

HTTP Methods: GET, HEAD, OPTIONS

Examples across supported CLIs:

  • kubectl get pods · kubectl describe node · kubectl logs deploy/api
  • aws ec2 describe-instances · gcloud compute instances list
  • gh repo view · terraform show · helm list

The default policy allows observe-tier requests without a prompt. Operators can override this per-namespace, per-project, or per-app in policy.yaml.

MODIFY

Standard write operations.

HTTP Methods: POST, PUT, PATCH

Examples:

  • kubectl apply -f manifest.yaml · kubectl patch deployment
  • aws s3 cp · gcloud compute instances create
  • fly deploy · terraform apply

Modify-tier requests escalate by default and block until a human approves them via the desktop app or msh local approval allow <id>.

SENSITIVE

Irreversible or high-impact operations.

HTTP Methods: DELETE, plus any request that touches a high-value resource regardless of method. For kubectl, reading Secrets is also elevated to sensitive because Secrets carry credentials.

Examples:

  • kubectl delete pod/x · kubectl get secret
  • aws s3 rm · gcloud projects delete
  • fly apps destroy

Sensitive-tier requests escalate by default.

BREAK-GLASS

Highest-risk operations. The default policy escalates the tier for human approval, while specific catastrophic operations are hard-denied. Operators can set other rules in policy.yaml.

For kubectl: dangerous subresources (exec, attach, portforward, proxy, debug) and mutations on privilege-escalation resources (RBAC roles/bindings, webhooks, CRDs, namespaces, PersistentVolumes).

For other CLIs: IAM mutations, credential issuance, infrastructure teardown.

Examples:

  • kubectl exec -it pod -- sh · kubectl port-forward
  • aws iam create-user · gcloud iam service-accounts create
  • fly machines api-proxy

Fail-closed behaviour

Unknown commands, unrecognised CLI tools, and classifiers that cannot determine a tier all fail closed — the request is treated as escalate or deny, never silently allowed. This prevents a novel or unexpected command from bypassing enforcement by accident.

The generic: block in policy.yaml covers any host on the inspect list that has no dedicated classifier. Its tier assignment starts with the HTTP method: GET/HEAD/OPTIONS → observe, POST/PUT/PATCH → modify,DELETE → sensitive. Paths containing destructive-looking prefixes (delete, destroy, drop, purge, terminate, evict) are escalated to at least sensitive regardless of method.


Supported CLI classifiers

The following CLI tools have dedicated classifiers with command-level tier resolution:

CLI toolInspect protocol keyCLI aliases recognised
kubectlkubectlkubectl, kustomize
Google Cloud CLIgcloudgcloud
AWS CLIawsaws
GitHub CLIgithubgh
Terraform / OpenTofu(CLI only)terraform, tofu
Helm(CLI only)helm
Cloudflare Wranglercloudflarewrangler, flarectl
Fly.ioflyflyctl, fly

Any host not matched by a dedicated classifier falls through to the generic: block (HTTP-method tier, raised to sensitive for destructive path segments).

Use msh local classify cli <argv> or msh local classify http <method> <url> to see exactly which tier the daemon would assign to any specific request before putting it in front of a real workload.