Protocols
Status: Available.
msh local's policy engine supports rules scoped to multiple infrastructure protocols. A single ~/.mezite/local/policy.yaml file governs AI agent access across different systems.
Supported protocols
| Protocol | Classifier | Scope keys |
|---|---|---|
kubectl | Kubernetes API operations | namespaces |
gcloud | Google Cloud CLI / googleapis.com | projects, regions, zones, orgs |
fly | Fly.io CLI / api.fly.io | apps, orgs |
aws | AWS CLI operations | regions |
github | GitHub CLI (gh) | (inspect-only; no scope-sugar) |
terraform | Terraform / OpenTofu CLI classification only | (inspect-only; no scope-sugar) |
helm | Helm CLI classification only | (inspect-only; no scope-sugar) |
cloudflare | Cloudflare CLI | (inspect-only; no scope-sugar) |
generic | Any inspected HTTPS host, tiered by HTTP method and destructive path segments | none (flat rules: only) |
Local SSH interception is not yet supported. Mezite providesSSH Access through its server proxy. There is no
ssh:policy block in the current release.
Policy format
The top level of policy.yaml is keyed by protocol name. Each block follows the same structure: inspect: (hosts to MITM), default:(fallback action), groups: (named tier/command selectors), optional scope-sugar lists, and a flat rules: fallback.
kubectl:
inspect:
- "*.eks.amazonaws.com"
- "*.gke.goog"
- "*.azmk8s.io"
default: escalate
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
delete:
tiers: [sensitive]
admin:
tiers: [break-glass]
namespaces:
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, delete, admin]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, delete, admin]
gcloud:
inspect:
- "*.googleapis.com"
default: escalate
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
destructive:
tiers: [sensitive]
iam:
tiers: [break-glass]
projects:
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]
fly:
inspect:
- "api.fly.io"
- "api.machines.dev"
- "*.fly.dev"
default: escalate
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
destructive:
tiers: [sensitive]
admin:
tiers: [break-glass]
apps:
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, admin]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, admin]
aws:
inspect:
- "*.amazonaws.com"
- "*.amazonaws.com.cn"
- "*.aws.amazon.com"
- "*.api.aws"
default: escalate
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
destructive:
tiers: [sensitive]
iam:
tiers: [break-glass]
regions:
- names: ["*"]
rules:
# Hard-deny a handful of catastrophic, irreversible
# operations outright — no approval prompt, just refused.
deny:
operations:
- DeleteVpc
- ScheduleKeyDeletion
- DeleteOrganization
- LeaveOrganization
- CloseAccount
- DeleteBucket
- DeleteHostedZone
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]
rules:
deny:
operations:
- DeleteVpc
- ScheduleKeyDeletion
- DeleteOrganization
- LeaveOrganization
- CloseAccount
- DeleteBucket
- DeleteHostedZone
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]The AWS classifier derives service/region from the endpoint hostname, applies per-operation tier rules, and floors credential-bearing services (IAM/STS/KMS/Organizations/SSO/Secrets Manager) to break-glass.
Scope-sugar blocks
Scope-sugar lists filter rules to a specific project, namespace, app, or other label extracted from the request. Blocks are first-match-winsdown the list.
kubectl — namespaces
kubectl:
...
namespaces:
- names: [prod-*, production]
rules:
escalate:
groups: [mutate, delete, admin]
allow:
groups: [read]
deny:
groups: [exec]
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, delete, admin]gcloud — projects, regions, zones, orgs
gcloud:
...
projects:
- names: [my-prod-project]
rules:
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]
allow:
groups: [read]
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]fly — apps, orgs
fly:
...
apps:
- names: [my-prod-app]
rules:
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, admin]
allow:
groups: [read]
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, admin]aws — regions
aws:
...
regions:
- names: [us-east-1, eu-west-*]
rules:
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]
allow:
groups: [read]
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]The operations: selector — pinning a specific API call
For protocols whose on-the-wire command is just an HTTP method (aws, gcloud), the real API verb lives in the classifier's operation label, not in commands:. Use the operations: selector to match it — a glob over the operation string (<service>.<collection>.<verb> for gcloud, the API action name for aws). The shipped default policy uses it to hard-deny a handful of catastrophic, effectively irreversible operations outright, with no approval prompt:
aws:
regions:
- names: ["*"]
rules:
deny:
operations:
- DeleteVpc # tears down an entire VPC
- ScheduleKeyDeletion # irreversibly destroys a KMS key
- DeleteOrganization # nukes the whole AWS Organization
- DeleteBucket # removes an S3 bucket
- DeleteHostedZone # tears down a Route 53 DNS zone
gcloud:
projects:
- names: ["*"]
rules:
deny:
operations:
- cloudresourcemanager.projects.delete # deletes a whole GCP project
- cloudresourcemanager.folders.delete # deletes a resource folder
- compute.networks.delete # tears down a VPC network
- cloudkms.cryptoKeyVersions.destroy # destroys a KMS key versionPrecedence is deny > escalate > allow, so an operations: deny wins even though those calls also sit in the destructive/iam groups.
generic: — arbitrary HTTPS hosts
The generic: block tiers requests from the HTTP method, raising destructive-looking path segments to at least sensitive, and applies to any host listed under inspect:. The wildcard * is legal under generic.inspect: only.
generic:
inspect: [] # add hosts here; ships empty so nothing is MITMd by default
default: escalate
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
destructive:
tiers: [sensitive]
admin:
tiers: [break-glass]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, admin]Glob patterns
All names: and inspect: values support glob patterns:
| Pattern | Matches |
|---|---|
"payments" | Exact match |
"staging-*" | Any name starting with staging- |
"*" | Everything (catch-all) |
Local SSH interception — coming soon
Coming soon. SSH interception is on the roadmap and not yet available in the shipping release. There is no
ssh:policy block; adding one has no effect. This page will be updated when SSH support ships.
Planned local SSH gateway support would intercept SSH connections and apply tier-based policy to shell sessions and SCP transfers. No configuration is available yet.
Validation
The policy engine rejects documents that reference unknown groups, contain empty rules: branches, or use * under a non-genericinspect: list. Glob patterns are compiled at load time; malformed patterns are a load error.
If a protocol block fails validation the entire policy reload is rejected. The daemon logs the error and keeps the previous working policy — no requests are dropped.