Policy Configuration
Status: Available.
Policy rules live at ~/.mezite/local/policy.yaml. The file is hot-reloaded by fsnotify — save it and the new policy takes effect within a second without restarting the daemon. If the YAML is invalid, the daemon logs a warning and keeps the previous working policy.
Schema overview
The top level is keyed by protocol (kubectl, gcloud, fly,generic, …). Each protocol block contains:
| Key | Purpose |
|---|---|
inspect: | Hostnames, globs, IPs, or CIDRs the daemon should MITM for this protocol |
default: | Fallback action (allow / escalate / deny) when no rule matches |
groups: | Named selectors — match requests by tiers:, commands:, or operations: |
<scope>: | First-match-wins scope-sugar list (namespaces, projects, regions, zones, orgs, apps) |
rules: | Flat allow/escalate/deny fallback, evaluated after scope blocks |
Actions: allow (forward immediately), escalate (block until a human approves or denies),deny (return 403 immediately).
The four risk tiers
| Tier | Typical operations |
|---|---|
observe | Read-only / GET; API discovery |
modify | Creates, updates, patches |
sensitive | Deletes, secret reads, credential operations |
break-glass | IAM grants, cluster-admin, destructive platform ops |
There are four tiers in V2 (
observe,modify,sensitive,break-glass). There is no Tier-1 "operate" or runbook tier.
Annotated example — kubectl
kubectl:
# Hosts to intercept. Add your own cluster URLs here.
inspect:
- "*.eks.amazonaws.com" # EKS
- "*.gke.goog" # GKE
- "*.azmk8s.io" # AKS
# Default: escalate anything that doesn't match a rule.
default: escalate
# Named groups — match by tier string or exact command label.
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
delete:
tiers: [sensitive]
admin:
tiers: [break-glass]
exec:
# commands: use the classifier's canonical "verb resource" form
# (visible in ~/.mezite/local/daemon.log on `classified:` lines).
commands: [exec, attach, port-forward, cp, debug, proxy]
# Scope-sugar: first-match-wins across the list.
namespaces:
- names: [prod-*, production]
rules:
escalate:
groups: [mutate, delete, admin]
commands:
- configmaps get
- configmaps list
allow:
groups: [read]
deny:
groups: [exec]
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, delete, admin]
deny:
groups: [exec]
# Flat fallback — hits when no namespaces: entry matched
# (cluster-scoped requests, API discovery, auth handshakes).
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, delete, admin]
deny:
groups: [exec]Annotated example — gcloud
gcloud:
inspect:
- "*.googleapis.com"
default: escalate
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
destructive:
tiers: [sensitive]
iam:
tiers: [break-glass]
projects:
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]
# Flat fallback for OAuth token refreshes, cross-service IAM,
# and discovery calls that carry no project label.
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]Annotated example — fly
fly:
inspect:
- "api.fly.io"
- "api.machines.dev"
- "*.fly.dev"
default: escalate
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
destructive:
tiers: [sensitive]
admin:
tiers: [break-glass]
apps:
- names: ["*"]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, admin]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, admin]Annotated example — aws
aws:
# AWS spans many services across several endpoint suffixes. These
# globs cover the bulk, China, the dual-stack .api.aws endpoints,
# and the .aws.amazon.com control plane.
inspect:
- "*.amazonaws.com"
- "*.amazonaws.com.cn"
- "*.aws.amazon.com"
- "*.api.aws"
default: escalate
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
destructive:
tiers: [sensitive]
iam:
tiers: [break-glass]
# The classifier emits a `region` label for regional endpoints
# (ec2.us-east-1.amazonaws.com); regions: is first-match-wins.
regions:
- names: ["*"]
rules:
# Hard-deny a handful of catastrophic, irreversible ops
# outright — no approval prompt, just refused. operations:
# matches the classifier's `operation` label (the real API
# verb, which the on-the-wire HTTP method does not carry).
deny:
operations:
- DeleteVpc
- ScheduleKeyDeletion
- DeleteOrganization
- LeaveOrganization
- CloseAccount
- DeleteBucket
- DeleteHostedZone
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]
# Flat fallback for global services (IAM, STS, Route 53, CloudFront),
# the S3 global endpoint, and credential handshakes — calls with no
# region label. The same hard-deny list is repeated here.
rules:
deny:
operations:
- DeleteVpc
- ScheduleKeyDeletion
- DeleteOrganization
- LeaveOrganization
- CloseAccount
- DeleteBucket
- DeleteHostedZone
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, iam]The shipped default policy wires up
kubectl,gcloud,aws,fly, andgeneric. Thegcloudandawsblocks hard-denya short list of catastrophic, irreversible operations (project/VPC/org/bucket/KMS-key deletion) via theoperations:selector — those are refused outright rather than escalated.
generic: — arbitrary hosts
The generic: block MITMs any host listed under inspect: and tiers requests from the HTTP method alone (GET/HEAD/OPTIONS → observe, POST/PUT/PATCH → modify, DELETE → sensitive). The wildcard *under inspect: is legal only in the generic: block.
generic:
inspect: [] # add hosts here; empty ships by default
default: escalate
groups:
read:
tiers: [observe]
mutate:
tiers: [modify]
destructive:
tiers: [sensitive]
admin:
tiers: [break-glass]
rules:
allow:
groups: [read]
escalate:
groups: [mutate, destructive, admin]Scope-sugar keyword reference
| Keyword | Protocol | Matched label |
|---|---|---|
namespaces: | kubectl | namespace |
projects: | gcloud | project |
regions: | gcloud | region |
zones: | gcloud | zone |
orgs: | gcloud | organization |
apps: | fly | app |
orgs: | fly | org |
Scope blocks are first-match-wins down the list. Each entry needs a names: glob list and a rules: block.
Glob patterns
| Pattern | Matches |
|---|---|
"payments" | Exact match |
"staging-*" | Any name starting with staging- |
"*" | Everything (catch-all) |
Policy decisions
| Decision | Behaviour |
|---|---|
allow | Request forwarded immediately |
deny | Request rejected with 403 |
escalate | Request blocked; operator must approve or deny via desktop app or msh local approval allow <id> / msh local approval deny <id> |
default: escalateis the safe default. Without an explicit rule, unknown commands surface an approval prompt rather than being silently allowed or denied.
Changes to
policy.yamlare hot-reloaded automatically — no daemon restart needed. If the new YAML is invalid, the daemon logs a warning and keeps the previous working policy.